Here, surely, Le Fanu has a point. Few doctors over the age of 35 have much hope of understanding molecular biology, but happily use the few drugs that genetic engineering has so far produced. There is, after all, no need to design your own carburettor to drive a car (do cars have carburettors these days?). It seems intrinsically unlikely that a doctor will be able to keep up with, let alone contribute to, the rapidly expanding world of molecular biology and at the same time maintain and develop his clinical skills. De-skilling occurs at frightening speed for doctors out of contact with patients and few patients would want to be treated by a scientist doing his two months per year on the clinical service 'to keep in touch'. Patient care cannot be allowed to become occupational therapy for scientists.
The middle of the book charts the rise and fall of clinical science and the clinical scientist, beginning with the visit of King George V to the new British Postgraduate Medical School at the Hammersmith Hospital in 1935. This account-well worth reading includes the problems of wartime medicine and the story of McMichael's original cardiac catheterizations. The Pappworth saga of 'human guineapigs' appears and then, following the failure of the Clinical Research Centre, we get to the clinical scientist as 'an endangered species'. The key feature of clinical science, and what has made it attractive to young doctors, is the opportunity it provides to study patients at a scientific level. As the supply of new drugs faltered and technology became too complicated and expensive, clinical science was hijacked by the new genetics. Although Le Fanu does not say so directly, the self-perpetuating oligarchy of molecular biologists defined their subject as clinical science, rather than as the basic science which it really is. They then manipulated the University Research Assessment exercise (RAE) to ensure that the only 'clinical science' that gets funded relates to new genetics. Universities having sold their souls to the RAE, the old-style clinical scientist who saw his place primarily at the patients' bedside was doomed.
One difficulty, Le Fanu suggests, is that today's medical students are much more intelligent than their ruggerplaying predecessors and can see through the modern ideas on which they are fed. This may well be true, but it is only part of the story. Juniors get fed up with the hours they have to work, with the poor pay when they compare themselves with their friends who work in the City and with the general loss of status of the medical profession. The preregistration house officers see themselves as clerking-machines and as robots who order tests and who treat people as statistics, using the numbers generated by clinical trials instead of treating patients as individuals. They pick up from their seniors a weariness that comes from continuous bombardment by the local chief executive or vice-chancellor, neither of whom (for different reasons) gives a fig for clinicians whether senior or junior.
If there is a solution and it is a big if Le Fanu believes it must come from a return to Oslerian virtues. The junior doctor must learn that his or her role is based upon the relationship with the individual patient. Guided by science, the doctor must select the minimum of appropriate tests, and deploy therapies according to individual needs. Clinical acumen and judgment must once more be respectable and respected. Of course Le Fanu is right. But dissatisfaction with medicine is not limited to juniors, as the increasing number of non-working doctors and early retirements makes only too clear. It is only the excitement of making a correct diagnosis, the fascination of the posttake ward round and, above all, the contact My contemporaries at Cambridge in the 1950s will recall the physiology lecturer who compared neuronal discharge to a lavatory flush: both undergo a refractory period after activation, but both then obey the all-or-none law. Patronizing perhaps, but very helpful to those of us not destined to become Nobel laureates. It came as a very welcome surprise to find that, in Time Of Our Lives, Professor Tom Kirkwood uses the same gift of imagery to clarify the harder concepts in his tour de force on ageing. Some may be irritated by his breezy journalistic style, but the book, which is aimed at a lay readership, would be tough going without it. Ageing has been much in the news lately and, partly because of the Royal Commission's report on long-term care, it has been getting an unfavourable press. Kirkwood's book is timely and I hope that many in the medical profession will swallow their pride and read it. Though it is for laymen many of us are laymen with regard to the complexities of molecular biology; and, though we may judge Kirkwood's descriptions of age-associated diseases superficial by comparison, the disparity is forgivable. Gerontology comprises several different disciplines, and social gerontologists are another group who will find gaps: they will find little here about the effects that an ever older population has on society, although there is an unexpected and imaginative twist in the tail-an epilogue taking the form of a sci-fi story set in a future era when techniques of cell replacement have made senescence obsolete. But as an exposition of the state of the art of biological aspects of gerontology, it will be a long time before a more authoritative or accessible work is produced. Tom Kirkwood, a biologist originally trained as a mathematician and now a professor of biological gerontology (with attitude), is best known for his 'disposable soma' theory. Different species vary the balance of their energy investment between perpetuation of the germ-line through reproduction (favoured by smaller, shorter-lived creatures) and maintenance and repair of the soma (relatively favoured by larger, longer-lived mammals such as man). The trade-off dictates the rate at which the organism suffers the enhanced susceptibility to death that is the hallmark of ageing. The elaboration of this theory demands an eclectic approach embracing many fields of biology including genetics, evolutionary theory and immunology as well as molecular biology and medicine-all presented with clarity and a delightful leavening of humour and humanity. The result is a wonderful concoction, a treasure trove of the important and the recondite, and my greatest hope would be that medical students might find time to read and be enriched by it. Malleus Maleficarum (1486) records the remorse in those accused of witchcraft:
Nicholas
'Tearing, dismemberment, and other methods could be resorted to additionally, to cause "agony in retribution". Execution was by burning by fire, using green wood for the slow burning of the grossly impenitent.
Recantation might mean the more merciful strangulation' (London: Folio Society, 1968) .
In a similar vein James H Hodges' Famous Trials series contains numerous examples of the value of exhibiting remorse in obtaining recommendations for mercy, or mitigating the severity of sentences. Nowadays, for maximum security Special Hospital patients and those prisoners serving mandatory (convicted of murder) and discretionary life sentences, mental health review tribunals and the Parole Board, respectively, struggle daily with such matters as remorse, reparation, and retribution. The problem is twofold: distinguishing true remorse from other varieties; and what to do with the remorseless. While apparent remorse gives some room for discourse, its absence strikes at the very heart of the business of punishment and invites an excessive response. Remorse and Reparation is a collection of essays by forensic psychiatrists and psychoanalysts (in the main), with contributions from sociologists, philosophers, Shakespearean scholars, and a psychologist. There is a lot about Hamlet, much of Freud and his followers, and some of the existentialists ideas. It is divided, rather artificially, into three sections: 'clinical', 'legal' and the ubiquitous 'other'.
Home suggests that grief may be a useful model to study remorse, a subject of great importance but with little empirical foundation. As a psychiatric member of the Parole Board Tidmarsh gives us his personal view: that the expression of guilt (insofar as it reflects remorse) is a necessary but not sufficient factor in recommending release (hence the hopeless position of those who claim innocence). Although Freud had declaimed that some were criminals from (as a consequence of a sense of guilt, in this volume Sohn makes the opposing and rather obvious point that it is amongst the most needy (the violent, the aggressive, and the dishonest) that the capacity for remorse and reparation is most lacking. This is particularly regrettable because those qualities are central to the capacity to change. Gudjonsson discusses the seeming contradiction between these explanations by introducing his own spin and invoking a simile which he has expropriated-the attribution of blame. Thomas' philosophical analysis is understandable and the sociological contribution is almost as obscure. Thus Borgeaud and Cox commend Bauman's view that moral responsibility is the starting point; the act of self-constitution:
'The kind of understanding of the moral self's condition which the post-modem vantage point allows is unlikely to make moral life easier. The most it can dream of is making it a bit more moral' (p. 144).
We all know that there are those who have made a profession of rectitude, dedicating their lives to such matters as reparation (for example, good works) and the creative arts (writing, sculpting). Perhaps they are postmodemn flagellants?
